In Brief

Indonesia seeks to become a ‘bridge builder’ on the international stage, but its global ambitions have outpaced its diplomatic resources, legitimacy and international support. Indonesia’s efforts to mediate conflicts in the Middle East have so far been unsuccessful, with the added consequence of diverting Indonesia’s attention away from crises closer to home. Indonesia could realise its bridge builder ambitions by utilising ASEAN, whose collective backing of Indonesia would enhance its credibility and influence as a mediator. Stronger regional leadership would provide a more effective foundation for Indonesia’s broader global ambitions.

Indonesia’s has made its ambition to become a ‘bridge builder’ between competing nations has known on the international stage. But in practice, Jakarta has become overstretched and unable to meaningfully contribute to addressing conflicts beyond its borders. Leveraging ASEAN could be the key to Indonesia’s bridge-builder ambitions, allowing Indonesia to compensate for its shortfalls in legitimacy, diplomatic support and resources.

Indonesia has long identified itself as a ‘middle power’ that, among other attributes, actively seeks a mediating role by facilitating dialogue and building coalitions with like-minded partners. Under the leadership of President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia has been promoting its middle power role as a ‘bridge builder’ — a country that seeks to avoid rigid alignment and contribute to mediating conflicts within, among and between the Global North and the Global South countries.

The Indonesian leadership see the escalating geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalry between countries as an opportunity to showcase its status as a middle power. As the newest full member of BRICS at the 2025 BRICS Summit, Prabowo declared Indonesia’s role as a bridge builder on the international stage. Prabowo reiterated this commitment in his debut speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025.

Amid Indonesia’s clear diplomatic signalling, a question remains as to whether Indonesia’s global ambitions can be realised given its limited resources as a middle power. The country’s inability to substantially contribute to addressing external conflicts in both 2025 and 2026 has demonstrated its significant constraints.

During the US–Israel war on Iran, both the United States and Iran shrugged off Prabowo’s offer to mediate their peace talks, a role which Pakistan later assumed. Likewise, Indonesia’s decision to join the US-led Board of Peace and proposal to shelter Palestinian refugees were met with domestic and international criticism.

Conflicts in the Middle East and faraway regions drained Indonesia’s diplomatic resources and attention, leaving the country unable to meaningfully exercise leadership in solving the conflicts in its own regional backyard. This includes the ongoing violence in Myanmar and tension along the Cambodia–Thailand border.

Aside from problematic proposals to address these conflicts, Indonesia’s shortcomings are rooted in the fact that its resources, international support and legitimacy are not commensurate with its far-reaching ambitions. A middle power like Indonesia cannot unilaterally pressure other countries to settle their conflict —the success of a middle power is determined by its ability to rally like-minded allies into pushing a strategic agenda.

Members of ASEAN are Indonesia’s most promising allies in its bridge builder ambitions. But Indonesia missed the opportunity to build such a coalition when it shifted its diplomatic priorities away from the grouping.

Between Prabowo’s inauguration in October 2024 and April 2026, the President has embarked on 49 state visits to 28 countries. Most of Prabowo’s tours took place outside of ASEAN. As of May 2026, Malaysia and Singapore are the only ASEAN members that Prabowo has visited more than once.

With Prabowo’s absence from the Russia–ASEAN Summit in 17–18 June 2026, the perception that Indonesia has sidelined ASEAN under Prabowo further makes it difficult for Indonesia to leverage ASEAN as a platform for realising its bridge builder vision.

Collective support from ASEAN members would help compensate Indonesia’s lack of resources and legitimacy in projecting its bridge-building role within and outside of Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s ability to secure ASEAN support would signal its credibility as a potential conflict mediator on the international stage.

Singapore’s experience demonstrates how having a strong regional presence enhances a country’s capacity to address extra-regional conflicts. Their successful hosting of historic talks between the United States and North Korea in 2018 could not be separated from its chairmanship of ASEAN that year, which fully supported the talks.

Indonesia would be well-placed to emulate the Singapore experience given its leadership reputation in ASEAN is firmly established. Prominent ASEAN leadership contributed to Indonesia’s success in mediating the peace process that ended the Third Indochina War in Cambodia in the late 1980s. Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2011 also allowed Jakarta to carry out its ‘shuttle diplomacy’ that prevented further escalation of the Cambodia–Thailand border crisis that same year.

The timing could not be better for Indonesia to reclaim ASEAN’s traditional status as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. In 2028, Indonesia will assume the rotational position of ASEAN Secretary-General, a five-year position last held by the country in 1993. The position can help Indonesia project its agenda through ASEAN.

Indonesia’s global ambition will ultimately be determined by how it asserts and cultivates its leadership in the region. Prioritising ASEAN will not compromise Indonesia’s far-reaching diplomatic ambition but rather complement its role to become a bridge builder, first in Southeast Asia and then on the global stage. 

****

By Arrizal Jaknanihan.

Arrizal is Researcher in the ASEAN Studies Program at The Habibie Center.

This article was published in eastasiaforum.org on 29 July 2026